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ABSTRACT
Spillovers from national industrial policies can 
cause helpful or harmful competition among policy 
makers and helpful or harmful interactions among 
the targeted industries. As a result, it is not in general 
possible to say whether industrial policy coordination 
is good or bad. However, reaching agreement at the 
EU level on any type of policy – trade policy, monetary 
policy or industrial policy – is costly in terms of time, 
information, and political goodwill. The contrast 
between the vagueness of the benefits of coordination 
and the surety of the decision-making costs suggests 
that the EU has no need to set up a new institutional 
structure for coordinating industrial policy. In the few 
cases where the merits of coordination are obvious, 
such as public spending on R&D, they will be obvious 
to all and ad hoc cooperation will work.
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Coordination of industrial policy 
in the European Union
1.  Introduction
Europe has long worried about its industrial competitiveness. The first page of the 1956 Spaak 
Report – a report that became the blueprint for the economics in the Treaty of Rome – worries 
about how Europe’s industries could stand up to US competition:
L’Europe bénéficie pour le développement de sa productivité d’une assimilation rapide des techniques à 
l’écart desquelles les circonstances l’avaient tenue. Dans l’état présent de son organisation économique, 
elle ne saurait prolonger ces progrès et soutenir par ses propres forces ce rythme d’expansion. Trois 
exemples feront concrètement apparaître ce que signifie, face aux possibilités du monde moderne, le 
cloisonnement européen des marchés. Il n’y a pas une entreprise automobile en Europe qui soit assez 
grande pour utiliser de manière économique les plus puissantes machines américaines. Aucun des pays 
du continent n’est capable sans apports extérieurs de construire de grands avions de transport. Dans 
le domaine de la science atomique les connaissances acquises à grands frais dans plusieurs des pays 
d’Europe ne représentent qu’une faible fraction de celles que les  États-Unis mettent maintenant librement 
à la disposition de leur industrie et des autres pays; et il faudrait des années pour produire quelques 
milliers de kilos de cet uranium enrichi dont l’Amérique vient d’annoncer qu’elle pouvait mettre à la 
disposition de son industrie et du reste du monde un surplus de 40 tonnes.
Tighter European integration has been one means through which Europe has promoted its industry, 
but this has sporadically been accompanied by a concern for more direct industrial policy. 
Industrial policy was all the rage in the 1980s, fostered by academic writings on the so-called 
strategic trade policy1, and the apparent success of Japan’s industrial policy. The 1990s, however, 
saw industrial policy fall from favour as free-market thinking was explicitly or implicitly embraced 
by all of Europe’s mainstream political parties. The emergence of East Asia, China in particular, and 
the accession of ten new, low-wage, low-productivity nations, however, has revived concerns that 
Europe is de-industrialising. The response has been to embrace bold goals in the Lisbon process. 
As part of this, industrial policy is back on the front burner of policy makers’ stoves.
The target of industrial policy is to influence the volume and composition of Europe’s industrial 
output, primarily its manufacturing output. In general, the aim is to boost the volume of production 
and/or jobs, although more subtle analysts focus on promoting ‘good jobs’, not just any jobs. So 
what then is industrial policy?
Moving from principles to practice, it is worth noting that everything affects everything in a 
general equilibrium system. Any policy in any factor or goods market in any nation in the world 
could, in principle, affect the volume and composition of Europe’s industrial output. But taking 
industrial policy to mean every policy in the world is to rob the concept of its analytic content. 
Moreover, most policies have negligible effects on Europe’s manufacturing sector, and so can be 
safely excluded from the list. But because everything could affect everything, there can never be 
a thin red line dividing policies that are industrial policies from those that are not. This, of course, 
is why it is absolutely impossible to develop a definitive definition of industrial policy. 
1  See Brander and Spencer (1985) and Leahy and Neary (2001) for a more a recent analysis.
2  See also Rodrick (2004) for recent academic arguments in favour of industrial policy.
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Failing a perfectly general definition, we shall fall back on the Humpty-Dumpty principle. The words 
mean what we say they mean. In particular, we shall consider all policies that have a significant 
effect on Europe’s industrial sector to be an industrial policy. The definition of ‘significant’ will be 
flexible, so we are not forced to disregard policies that we believe are relevant. This casts the net 
rather widely, but we believe that is the only way to view coordination. 
The aim of this paper is to consider the advantages and disadvantages of coordinating industrial 
policy at the EU-wide level, either by outright delegation – as in the case of trade policy (the 
Common External Tariff is set at the EU, not national level) – or other looser forms of coordination. 
We start in Section  with the economic pros and cons of coordinating industrial policies. As the 
reference to pros and cons might suggest, we will see that coordination could be helpful in some 
circumstances, but harmful in others. We will also argue that the justification for coordination is 
stronger in the case of so-called specific (or vertical) industrial policies, but that coordination in 
these cases might well mean an agreement among nations to refrain from such policies. Section  
zooms in on cases where policy coordination makes sense and asks whether it would not be even 
better to delegate such policies to a supranational authority, as it is done, for instance, with trade 
policy or monetary policy in the eurozone. Section 4, which returns to looser forms of coordination, 
examines how the degree of spatial and sectoral spill-over effects and of international factor 
mobility influences the pros and cons of coordinating industrial policies. Section 5 concludes.
2.  Coordination: pros and cons
2.1 A simple analytical framework
Good theory helps organise one’s thinking about the insanely complex world we live in. To do this, 
the theory must be relevant and correct, but not obvious. Many economists skip the first point and 
build up the third point by using confusing notation and overly elaborate frameworks. The best 
theory is where the relevance is self-evident and the theory is correct and not obvious beforehand, 
but becomes obvious after the intuition is provided. Producing such theory is a tall order, but 
fortunately there is almost nothing new under the sun when it comes to coordination issues in 
general. The classic paradigm is the strategic-complement-strategic-substitute framework.
We start, as all good theory does, by radically simplifying the world in order to focus on essentials. 
This prevents muddled thinking when we start adding complexities back into the mix. 
Imagine that the world consists of two symmetric countries with governments that are perfect 
– they know everything about the world that matters and they care only about their country’s 
wellbeing. Moreover, suppose they can sign enforceable contracts with other governments. As it 
turns out, this case is too simple to help us understand real-world complexities since in this case, 
cooperation can never be bad. If international spillovers of any sort lead cooperating nations to 
choose policies that they would not without cooperation, then the world is a better place. The 
argument rests on a simple revealed preference argument. Governments know best and care only 
about wellbeing, so if they choose something with coordination that they would not have chosen 
without coordination, then the coordinated outcome must be better. To paraphrase Dr. Pangloss, 
“Coordination is always for the best, in the best of all possible words.” 
  As the great egg said to Alice: “When I use a word,” Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, “it means just what I 
choose it to mean -- neither more nor less.” (Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking Glass, Chapter 6).
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Unfortunately, while there are such perfect public servants in this world, not all government 
officials and politicians are totally selfless. Indeed, assuming that all politicians are interested in 
things other than the welfare of their electors is probably closer to reality than assuming they 
are all perfect public servants. For example, it is quite common for politicians to systematically 
favour politically powerful special interest groups – e.g., granting them tax breaks, subsidies, and 
favourable laws – even when this is bad for the average citizen. This is at least as true in the area 
of industrial policy as it is in other areas of economics.
Allowing for this type of political economy distortions – i.e., a situation where there is a wedge 
between the government’s objectives and social welfare – we can easily get second-best results 
where coordination actually makes things worse. This point is illustrated with the help of Figure 1, 
which illustrates the link between the industrial policies (IP) of two nations, Home and Foreign. 
The top pair of lines shows the best-reaction functions of a government when industrial policies are 
strategic complements. The basic idea of strategic complements in the context of industrial policy 
is that the more one government does, the more the other wants to do; production subsidies or 
tax competition would be good examples. Loosely speaking, strategic complements reflect cases of 
negative policy spillovers. That is, when the Home government chooses its policy uncooperatively, 
the higher the Foreign government’s policy choice, the higher the optimal response for the Home 
government, and so on. In these circumstances, cooperation will lead to a lower level of policy in 
both nations. In Figure 1, this can be seen by the fact that the uncoordinated equilibrium, E1, is 
further out on the 45-degree ray and so involves a higher level of policy for both nations (since 
we have assumed that nations are symmetric, we do not have to show best-reaction functions 
for both).
Is the coordinated equilibrium, E2, better than the uncoordinated equilibrium, E1? In general, there 
is no unambiguous answer to this question. If the ‘bliss point’, i.e., the optimal policy choice from 
a social welfare perspective is B1, coordination moves the outcome in the wrong direction, and 
the answer is ‘no.’ If the bliss point is B2, coordination moves things in the right direction, and the 
answer is ‘yes.’ Since the bliss point could, in principle, be anywhere, we can make no generally 
valid comments on the advisability of coordination.
One example where coordination moves both nations in the right direction might be production 
subsidies. In the absence of coordination, both countries choose a high level of production subsidies 
that in equilibrium distort competition. Coordination in this case would move both countries 
towards a lower level of subsidies (closer to B2). One example where coordination might be 
counterproductive is tax competition. The distortion created by the externality at the international 
level (the attempt to attract mobile capital at the expense of the other country) generates too 
much tax competition. However, suppose that at the national level another distortion (political 
economy for example) exists such that taxes on capital are too high so that the bliss point is one 
where there are low taxes or high tax competition (point B1). The important point is that without 
coordination the two distortions more or less compensate each other. With coordination between 
the two countries, the international distortion is removed leaving the national one alone and the 
outcome is further away from the bliss point. In the next section, we spell out more precisely 
another example where coordination may be counterproductive4.
4  The possibility of counterproductive international coordination has been extensively studied in the field of international 
macroeconomics (see Rogoff 1985, Canzoneri and Henderson 1991, and Canzoneri et al. 2006). In Canzoneri and Henderson 
(1991), it is also shown that if only a subset of countries (such as the EU) cooperates, then this limited cooperation may be 
counterproductive. The reason is again that coordination among EU members eliminates one distortion. This distortion 
may have actually compensated for another one with another group of countries. One could also apply this example to 
the issue of industrial policies.
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Note that we have focused on political economy distortions, but the governments’ choices 
could deviate from social optimality for many reasons – information problems being a leading 
contender.
Figure 1. Coordination vs. uncoordinated outcomes
Home IP
Foreign IP
E1
Uncoordinated
E2
Coordinated
E3
Coordinated
E4
B2
Uncoordinated
B1
Strategic
substitutes
Strategic
complements
Strategic complements, however, is not the only possibility. Many industrial policies are marked 
by a free-rider problem, where the more one nation does, the less the other nation wants to do: 
nations’ policies are thus strategic substitutes. Loosely speaking, strategic substitutes imply positive 
policy spillovers; R&D policies in the presence of knowledge spillovers are a good example. In 
this case, the reaction functions slope downward, and the coordinated policy outcome is beyond 
the uncoordinated one since each nation takes account of the positive benefit of its policy on 
the other nation. Note that the ordering of coordinated and uncoordinated outcomes is reversed: 
coordination leads the two symmetric nations to raise their level of policy, they settle in E3 rather 
than E4. 
Is coordination a good idea here? Again the issue depends on the bliss point. If bliss would involve 
a high level of policy, coordination improves the situation (point E3 is closer to B1 than E4 is). R&D 
policies would be an example of this (see section .. on global public goods). If bliss would 
involve little policy, for example B2, then coordination is a bad thing. Subsidies for innovation 
policy for some politically sensitive sectors (say defence industry) might be a case. Innovation 
produces positive knowledge spillovers at the international level so that coordination would lead 
to more subsidies for innovation. However, one could make the argument that some domestic 
political distortion leads to too much subsidy for innovation in certain sectors (again, say, defence 
or other ‘strategic’ industries). Which distortion is most important in practice is difficult to evaluate 
in general, but the important point here is that international coordination is not always going 
to lead to a better situation in a world where many international and domestic distortions exist. 
Another way to say this is that coordination is not necessarily a good idea if the international 
distortion eliminated by coordination actually compensates for a national distortion.
Still, it is easier to think of situations where well-informed and well-intentioned governments 
could improve the outcome with coordination. We start, therefore, in the next sub-section with 
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two examples of harmful coordination. One is called ‘jurisdictional competition’ and the other 
‘task allocation among government levels’ – both issues are well known from the public finance 
literature. Situations where coordination is helpful are left for sub-section ..  
2.2 Harmful coordination
2.2.1 Jurisdictional competition and Europe’s anti-industrial policy
European voters demand a high level of social protection from their governments and they are 
willing to pay for it through taxes, or at least it seems so from watching the electoral competitions 
on the Continent. One extremely important source of the money needed to pay for this comes 
from a very high tax on employment, often called ‘social charges.’
Taxes discourage the taxed activity, so it is not surprising that labour economists consistently find 
that employment taxes reduce employment. For this reason, many economists view employment 
taxes as an inferior way of raising the money governments need to pay for the social policies that 
voters want, especially since high employment levels are on every government’s wish list. The 
reasons why this inferior tax is used so widely are complex, but one of the most important ones is 
that people do not understand the true burden of the tax. Without thinking hard about the matter, 
it appears that corporations pay a large fraction of the tax. Many voters therefore believe that social 
charges are a good way of forcing corporations to pay their fair share. But corporations are no one, 
so corporations cannot pay anything. The burden of the tax either falls on the firm’s shareholders, 
workers, or customers. Since both customers and shareholders have a broader range of alternatives, 
prices adjust so that much of the burden of the tax – the ‘incidence’ in public finance jargon – falls 
on the workers. In particular, such taxes lower the take-home pay of workers. 
But what has this got to do with industrial policy coordination? As it turns out, social charges act 
as an ‘anti-industrial policy’ because industrial goods are traded and service sector goods are not 
(the share of output of agriculture in the EU is so small that we can ignore it). To see why this is 
so, let us look at the basic economic impact of wage and non-wage costs on employment. To get 
to the core of the argument, we start by making strong assumptions that radically simplify the 
range of issues at hand. We add back some important aspects of reality after having established 
the basic points. 
Consider a single nation and start with the unrealistic, but convenient simplifying assumption 
that labour markets operate like other markets (i.e., wages adjust so that there is no involuntary 
unemployment). Moreover, to keep things simple, suppose the nation starts without any social 
policies and initially is closed to trade. The equilibrium, shown in the left panel of Figure , is where 
the real wage is w and employment is L.  
Now suppose the government adopts a whole series of social policies, for example limits on working 
hours, obligatory retirement benefits, maternity leave, sick leave, six weeks of annual holidays, and 
so on. These policies would undoubtedly be good for most workers. Indeed, most Europeans view 
these as necessities, not luxuries. Yet, however good these policies are for workers and the society 
at large, such policies are expensive for firms. To be specific, suppose that they raise the cost of 
employing workers by T euros per week. What happens to wages and employment?
The new equilibrium wage paid to workers – the take-home pay – falls to w’, while the cost to the 
firm of employing a worker rises to w’+T. Hence, the social policy ‘tax’ drives a wedge between the 
wage cost to the firm, w’+T, and workers’ take-home pay, w’. It is useful to think of the tax being 
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paid partly by consumers (in the form of higher prices) and partly by workers (in the form of lower 
take-home pay). The firms we consider here are competitive and so cannot bear any part of T; they 
earn zero profits before and after T is imposed. Or to put it differently, if T did lower the rate of 
return on firms’ capital, capital would move elsewhere. The new equilibrium employment in the 
economy is L’. The social policy thus leads to a drop in aggregate employment (left-hand panel of 
Figure ). As we are assuming for now that labour demand in both sectors responds in the same 
way to changes in the wage cost to firms (see the middle and right-hand panel of Figure ), the 
aggregate drop in employment splits evenly between industry and services. 
Figure 2. Social charges and jobs in a closed economy.
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How high will the tax be? On one hand, the government would like a high tax since it is a politically 
convenient way of paying for social policy (the true effects of the tax are not very transparent to 
voters). On the other hand, the government will not be happy about the job destruction. The tax 
chosen presumably is the politically optimal trade-off between these conflicting objectives. 
Note that this is one of those situations where political expediency leads governments to choose a 
level of employment taxes that is too high from the social perspective. Taxes like a value-added tax 
could raise the same revenue without destroying jobs, but voters find it much easier to understand 
the impact of the VAT, so politicians ‘hide’ the taxes in the form of social charges. 
Europe’s economies are far from closed. So let us examine how openness to international trade 
changes the anti-industrial policy impact of social charges. A simple way to introduce openness in 
this sort of diagram is to flatten the labour demand curve. The labour demand curve in a particular 
sector, industry for example, is downward sloped for two reasons. First, a higher real wage leads 
to capital-labour substitution and thus lowers labour demand, but this channel is not affected by 
openness. Second, higher wages mean higher prices, resulting in lower sales and less of a need for 
workers. The extent to which higher prices translate into lower sales and thus employment depends 
intimately on openness. If the sector’s customers have ready access to imported alternatives, each 
price rise yields a greater drop in labour demand. Or, to put it simply, the labour demand curve gets 
flatter. This is shown by the dashed labour demand curve in the right-hand panel of Figure .
In setting the level of 
social charges, the 
government needs 
to trade off political 
expediency (suggesting 
high charges) against 
employment effects 
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As trade becomes freer, the labour demand curve in industry gets flatter, but little happens to the 
labour demand curve in the services sector since most services are non-traded and, thus, firms 
have greater scope to pass on higher wages in the form of higher consumer prices. What all this 
means is that unless social charges are reduced, progressively more open markets foster a shift in 
employment from the traded goods sector (industry) to the non-traded goods sector (services). 
Figure 3. Social charges and jobs in an open economy 
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In short, high social charges are an anti-industrial policy since they tend to shift jobs out of industry 
and into non-traded goods sectors like services, and the impact gets worse as markets progressively 
open to international trade. The intuition should be clear. High non-wage labour costs force firms 
to raise prices. In non-traded goods sectors, all firms in the market face roughly the same need 
to raise prices, so the overall impact on any particular firm is dampened. In traded goods sectors, 
customers have an alternative to paying the higher price charged by local firms – they can buy 
abroad. Thus, a given increase in non-wage cost has a systematically more negative impact on the 
competitiveness of firms in industry than it does on services firms. The natural result is a shift in 
the nation’s employment pattern from industry to services.
It is interesting to note that the force with which this logic imposes itself on a particular nation 
depends upon how open it is. Small nations like Ireland, Finland, and the new member states of 
the European Union have little in the way of sheltered markets, so the cost of not reforming is 
much higher for them than it is for large nations like Germany and France. Little wonder, therefore, 
that the small nations of Europe have tended to be the ones who have reformed the fastest (and 
reaped the most benefits from globalisation).
How have governments reacted to this? In answering this question, we finally get to the issue of 
jurisdictional competition – more precisely: the merits of it. Apart from bemoaning this aspect 
of globalisation while embracing globalisation in general, European governments have tended 
to moderate the rate at which they have increased social charges, and in some cases they have 
decreased them. Since social charges are an economically inefficient way of raising taxes, this 
tendency has probably improved Europe’s economic welfare, even if it has posed problems for 
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politicians who were used to hiding much of the tax burden from voters by way of social charges. 
In short, social charges are a good example of where governments choose a policy level that is 
too high. 
If European governments coordinated on social charges – that is, required a minimum level 
– the average level of social charges would surely increase. The point is that the industrial job 
losses generated by higher social charges, especially in traded goods sectors, is a mechanism 
that prevents European governments from hiding an even greater slice of the tax burden in this 
economically inefficient but politically expedient tax. Coordinating on a minimum level of social 
charges would allow governments to raise the social charges with less loss of employment. How 
high would it rise? Of course, no one can know, but assuming governments choose the level to 
balance job losses against political expediency, one might guess that governments would raise the 
tax to a level where the job loss was more or less at its pre-coordination level. This would probably 
improve the welfare of European politicians but harm Europe’s economy.
In Figure 1, this is a situation where coordination would move the outcome from E4 to E3 (higher 
taxes), but this would be harmful since the bliss point involves lower social charges, not higher 
ones. It follows that coordination on social charges is bad since it inhibits competition among 
governments that would prevent them from overtaxing their citizens due to political economy 
distortions.
2.2.2 Subsidiarity and task allocation among different government levels
We will now look at two other factors that might argue against coordinating (industrial) policies: 
one is the diversity across EU nations and the other is the informational advantage of national 
governments over a central EU authority.
To start with diversity, productive conditions differ widely across the EU, and Member States’ attitudes 
towards government intervention also vary a great deal. In these circumstances, centralisation or 
even strict coordination of industrial policy can result in a one-size-fits-all compromise that might 
be inferior for most or even all EU nations. Indeed, this is probably the main reason why most of 
Europe’s industrial policies are set at the national or even regional level.
To illustrate this general idea more concretely, consider the two-nation model shown in Figure 4. The 
downward-sloped curves in the diagram show the marginal value per firm (MV) of implementing 
industrial policy; so they are something like demand curves for industrial policy. D1 and D2 show 
the marginal value curves for the two nations under study. The marginal value of industrial policy 
differs in the two nations, for example, perhaps country 1 has a well-functioning venture capital 
market that exploits many opportunities while country  has none, so the marginal value of 
industrial policy is systematically higher in country .
What levels of industrial policy would the two nations choose independently? If the marginal cost 
per firm (MC) of undertaking industrial policy is the same in the two nations (we assume this for 
simplicity), the government of country 1 would best serve its citizens by choosing IPd1 where the 
per-firm marginal value equals the per-firm marginal cost (d is a mnemonic for decentralised). The 
government of country  would choose a higher level of industrial policy, IPd2. Contrast this with 
the situation of strict coordination in the sense of imposing the same level of industrial policy in 
both nations. The best one-size-fits-all policy is IPc (c for coordinated), where the per-firm cost 
matches the average marginal value per firm (Davg).
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Plainly, the strictly coordinated outcome is inferior. Taking the decentralised choice as the initial 
situation, both regions are made worse off. Country 1 has too much industrial policy whereas 
country  has too little. The welfare loss of country 1 from coordination is reflected in the size of 
the triangle A (this measures the gap between the marginal value and the marginal cost integrated 
over the change in the level of policy). The loss of country  is shown by area B. 
Figure 4. Diversity of preferences and decentralisation 
Marginal value 
and cost of IP 
Level of IP
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IPd1 IPd2IPc
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A
B
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MC per firm
Of course, it is possible for the central authority to choose separate industrial policies for the two 
nations, but then the best it can do is to reproduce the uncoordinated outcome. More important, 
however, the above discussion assumed that national governments and the central authority were 
perfectly well informed. In reality, neither is. But it is reasonable to assume that the cost of gathering 
information on national preferences for and costs of industrial policy is lower at the national than 
the EU level. It follows that even if coordination were successful in tailoring industrial policies to 
national conditions, formulating and implementing it would be more costly than uncoordinated 
national polices.
All in all, given the diversity across nations, the informational advantage that national governments 
have, and the difficulty of negotiating common policies in a group of nations as diverse as the 
EU, it is unlikely that the centralised policy choice would be as good as the decentralised one. 
We thus arrive at the general presumption that coordinating industrial policy at the EU level is likely 
to be harmful or useless. Of course, strong spillovers can counter this presumption. This takes us 
to cases where coordination could help.
2.3 Helpful coordination
2.3.1 Negative spillovers: beggar-thy-neighbour policies
Most international coordination of industrial policy in the EU and in the world more generally 
consists of what might be called mutual self-denial, that is, nations agree to prohibit beggar-thy-
neighbour industrial policies. The EU’s prohibition on most forms of direct state aid to industry is 
a classic example, along with the WTO’s prohibition on export subsidies.
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Consider an industrial policy that lowers the marginal costs of firms in a specific sector within a 
single nation. This policy will create negative pecuniary externalities for firms in other nations. In 
particular, the enhanced competitiveness of the favoured firms will depress the price of the good 
they produce in all markets – presuming the good is traded – and this will force un-favoured firms 
to accept both lower prices and lower sales. Of course, the welfare effects of this might be just the 
reverse – the nation pursuing this policy might end up losing as a whole and other nations might 
end up winning overall – but such policies are generally viewed as bad, and this for two distinct 
reasons. First, many governments act as if the interest of their industrial firms represented the 
interest of their nations. Second, even without this sort of political economy distortion, it is easy to 
argue that allowing such beggar-thy-neighbour policies would result in a non-cooperative outcome 
of the prisoner’s dilemma type where all nations adopt expensive industrial policies merely to 
neutralise the effects of foreign industrial policy.
The Treaty of Rome prohibits an extremely wide range of such policies. These include not just 
proactive industrial policies that have direct effects on other Member States’ markets, but also trade 
barriers that are meant to favour local firms in the local market. In terms of Figure 1, we have been 
considering industrial policies that are strategic complements, and agreement to refrain from such 
policies could be viewed as a move from E1 to E2, with the bliss point being B2.
2.3.2 Positive spillovers: global public goods
A classic example of where coordination improves outcomes is the case of global public goods. In 
the case of industrial policy, spending on research and development (R&D), especially on science 
and technology, has global public good aspects in the sense that one EU nation’s spending bolsters 
the competitiveness of industrial firms in all EU nations. As R&D spending of one nation reduces 
other nations’ incentive to spend on R&D too, we are thus considering industrial policies that are 
strategic substitutes in the parlance of Figure 1.
Figure 5. Coordinated vs. uncoordinated R&D spending
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Consider the example of spending on basic research in the pharmaceutical industry. The knowledge 
created with the help of public money facilitates the development of new products in all of Europe’s 
pharmaceutical companies, not just those in the nation paying for it. However, the cost of the 
funding falls solely on the paying nation. Figure 5 illustrates the situation.
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The curve marked IC1, shows the preferences of country 1 towards R&D spending by itself and 
country . The important part is that country 1 prefers every point above its IC since such points 
involve more spending by country  – which provides free spillovers for the firms of country 1 – for 
any given level of spending by country 1. The line marked BRF1 (the best-reaction function) shows 
the best responses of country 1 for any given level of spending by country . The corresponding 
curves with the subscript ‘2’ show the analogous constructs for country .
If the two nations set their R&D spending levels in an uncoordinated fashion, the outcome will 
be the point marked U; this is where country 1 is doing its best taken as given the spending of 
country  – and vice versa. In other words, the combination of R&D spending implied by point U 
is stable in the sense that neither nation would want to change its spending unilaterally. 
Figure 5 illustrates the possible gains from coordinating nations’ R&D spending: all points between 
the two IC-curves (northeast of U) are combinations of spending where both nations would be 
better off. Such points are called the region of mutual gain. How is it that nations would choose 
point U when both could be better off by choosing combinations of spending in the region of 
mutual gain? The logic explaining this is exactly akin to the logic behind the well-known prisoners’ 
dilemma, and can be best described as a coordination failure. 
Note that an outcome like C is unlikely to arise without some form of institutional commitment  on 
the part of the two nations. If country 1 believed that country  would spend at the level implied 
by point C, the best unilateral move of country 1 would be to cut its spending to zero and free 
ride on the R&D spending of country . This is the deviation-from-coordination point D1. Of course, 
as country  is symmetric, its best unilateral reaction to country 1 spending at point C would be 
to cut its spending down to zero (point D2). This is where a supranational organisation like the EU 
comes into the picture. If EU nations can credibly commit to spending at point C, they will all be 
better off. For example, if nations simultaneously commit funds to the EU, the EU will spend it 
and all nations are better off. Note that without the EU, nations could probably succeed in some 
coordination involving a level of spending that is between U and C. The basic reason being that any 
‘cheating’ by one nation could induces the other countries to revert to the uncooperative outcome. 
Thus, the losses each nation fears from the breakdown of coordination and the gains they enjoy 
when they coordinate provide the ‘carrot and stick’ necessary to maintain cooperation.
2.4 Other aspects shaping the pros and cons of coordinating industrial policy 
2.4.1 General vs. specific industrial policy
When it comes to prohibiting and thus coordinating industrial policies – especially subsidies – it is 
important to distinguish between general (or horizontal) and specific (or vertical) policies. Policies 
applied to all sectors are called general policies and those applied to only some sectors are called 
specific policies. General policies will lead to wage adjustments that fully, or at least largely, offset 
the initial competitiveness effects of such policies. As a result, there is a general presumption that 
general policies are less likely to be beggar-thy-neighbour policies.
To illustrate the point, consider a nation with two industries, chemicals and textiles, whose prices 
are fixed by international trade. In Figure 6, the solid lines show the labour demand curves for 
each industry in the two left-hand panels and the nation’s aggregate labour demand in the right-
hand panel. The right-hand panel also shows the nation’s labour supply curve with a solid line. It 
is vertical since we suppose, for simplicity, that the supply of labour does not rise with an increase 
in wages. The equilibrium wage is w and employment in the two sectors is LC and L T .
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Consider now the impact of a general wage subsidy, i.e., one that applies to both sectors. This lowers 
the marginal production costs and thus raises the value of the marginal productivity of workers 
by the amount of the subsidy S. In Figure 6, this leads to an upward shift in the labour demand 
curves (the dashed lines). In essence, this is because the general wage subsidy enables firms in 
both sectors to offer higher wages. What are the effects on equilibrium wages and employment? 
Since the aggregate supply of labour is fixed, the equilibrium wage in both sectors rises by the full 
amount of the subsidy, reaching wg (g stands for ‘general’), and aggregate and sectoral employment 
remains unchanged. In other words, a general equilibrium change in production costs (the wage 
hike) will exactly offset the general wage subsidy. In sum, in this simplified world, a general subsidy 
would have no impact on the nation’s production pattern and thus would have no negative effects 
on industry in other nations. It follows that the issue of coordination does not arise.
Figure 6. General vs. specific industrial policy
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If the wage subsidy, by contrast, is specific to one sector, the outcome is quite different. Suppose 
the chemicals sector gets the wage subsidy but the textile sector does not. In this case, the chemical 
industry’s demand for labour corresponds to the dashed line. Like a general subsidy, the specific 
subsidy enables chemicals firms to offer higher wages for a given level of employment. By contrast, 
textile’s labour demand curve remains unchanged and thus corresponds to the solid line. The 
aggregate labour demand curve is the dotted line shown in the right-hand panel; for obvious 
reasons, it lies between the solid line and the dashed line.
What are the effects on equilibrium wages, aggregate employment, and employment in each sector? 
The nation’s wage would rise somewhat, to ws (s stands for ‘specific’). With labour mobility across 
sectors, the nation’s textile sector becomes less competitive as there is no subsidy to offset the 
increase in nation-wide wages. But with an increase in equilibrium wages, textiles’ labour demand 
shrinks along the solid demand curve and employment in the textile sector drops to L’T. By contrast, 
the competitiveness of the chemicals sector rises because the wage hike does not fully offset the 
subsidy paid to firms in the chemicals sector. Employment and output of chemicals rises, with 
employment reaching L’C . The nation’s trade partners would complain that this specific policy gave 
the nation’s chemicals producers an unfair advantage. For this reason, this sort of sector-specific 
industrial policy is coordinated in the EU in the sense that it is generally forbidden. 
Some caveats and complications are worth mentioning. The diagram used above yields the 
unambiguous result that general policies do not distort competition. The real world, as always, is 
much more complex and most of these complexities suggest that even general policies can have 
distortionary effects (for instance, if the labour supply curve slopes upward). All in all, in a more 
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realistic model, even general policies can distort competition, but the size of the distortion is likely 
to be small as long as policies are indeed ‘general’. 
We have mentioned above that the Treaty of Rome prohibits an extremely wide range of policies 
that have direct effects on other EU members’ markets or aim at favouring local firms in the local 
market. But such coordination stretches beyond the EU, an issue we sketch next.
2.4.2 WTO obligations
EU nations are members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and signatories to the General 
Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Under the WTO/GATT (WTO from here on), nations are 
not allowed to provide subsidies and engage in policies that distort international trade. But since 
trade is just the difference between national production and national consumption, and the whole 
point of industrial policy is to foster industrial production, any discussion of industrial policy must 
be informed of WTO strictures.
WTO rules discipline the use of subsidies, and regulate the actions nations can take to counter 
the effects of subsidies. According to the WTO, a policy is a subsidy when it involves a financial 
contribution, when this financial contribution comes from a government, and when the policy 
provides a benefit to the receiving firms. A key concept here – a concept that is also very much a 
part of the EU’s rules on subsidies – is the concept of a ‘specific’ subsidy. This is a subsidy obtainable 
only by an enterprise, industry, group of enterprises, or group of industries in a particular nation. 
General subsidies – investment tax credits, for instance – are not subject to WTO discipline since 
there is a presumption that general equilibrium price adjustments will offset the policy’s impact 
on trade. A further distinction must be made between production and export subsidies.
According to the WTO, subsidies fall into two bins, ‘prohibited’ and ‘actionable’. Prohibited subsidies 
are designed to distort international trade, either by promoting exporters, or by promoting local 
goods at the expense of imported goods. It is important to note that a strict interpretation of 
WTO rules suggests that almost all forms of industrial policy of the EU and its member would be 
prohibited or actionable. 
2.4.3 Competition policy as industrial policy
Policy makers tend to view preserving industrial firms by shielding them against competition as an 
obvious way of promoting industrial production. Although this might be well-intended, it can be a 
self-defeating policy. What is more, promoting competition can be considered a welfare-enhancing 
industrial policy. This sub-section sets out why.
The gist of the argument is as follows. Protecting firms against competition results in too many, too 
small firms that must charge high prices to compensate for their inability to reap scale economies. 
High prices result in lower demand and production and, thus, protecting existing firms can 
result in lower industrial production. One clear real-world example was seen in telecom services. 
Before liberalisation, each European nation had its own monopoly provider, services were expensive 
since firms were small and, as a result, consumers did not spend much on telecoms. With the 
liberalisation of telecoms, competition has forced a massive industrial restructuring, increase in the 
size of firms, and reduction in the price of services. The result has been a boom in the amount of 
telecom services produced and consumed in Europe.
Working through the logic of this argument, however, is tricky. The task is eased by using a diagram 
in which the number of firms (assumed to be identical for simplicity), firms’ mark-up of prices over 
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marginal cost, the scale of firms, and aggregate production are determined. The diagram, shown 
in Figure 7, draws on Baldwin and Wyplosz (004). 
Figure 7. Prices, output, firm size, and number of firms in a closed economy
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Source: Baldwin and Wyplosz (004)
The diagram has three panels. The middle panel is the simplest so that is where we start. It shows 
the demand curve facing the sector. To keep things simple, we assume that Europe is closed so 
that total consumption equals total production. In this way, the middle panel tells us what total 
production will be, once the price is determined.
The left panel shows the average and marginal cost curves for a typical firm in an industry 
characterised by economies of scale. We assume that the number of firms adjusts to eliminate 
pure profits, so in equilibrium a firm’s scale of production must be such that its average cost 
equals the price it receives.
The right panel is the most intricate of the three. On its vertical axis, this panel has the mark-up, 
i.e., the difference between price and marginal cost. On its horizontal axis, it measures the number 
of identical firms. The COMP curve shows the equilibrium combination of mark-up and number 
of firms assuming Cournot competition. Plainly, COMP slopes downward since more competitors 
push down the mark-up that each firm can charge. The BE curve shows for alternative mark-ups 
the number of identical firms that break even at this mark-up, with break even meaning that price 
equals average cost. The BE curve slopes upward because as the number of firms rises, sales per 
firm fall, average costs of the typical firm goes up and, thus, firms would need a higher mark-up 
in order to cover their fixed costs.
The equilibrium E in the three panels identifies the equilibrium number of firms (n), mark-up (µ), 
price (p), firm size (x), and total output/consumption (C). 
We can use the BE-COMP diagram to explain how competition policy can promote industrial 
production and why competition policy can be considered an industrial policy. To make the point, 
let us recall that the COMP curve in Figure 7 assumed Cournot competition, that is, firms do not 
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collude. We turn now to considering the possibility that firms collude. To fix ideas, we first consider 
extreme collusion, i.e., perfect collusion in which a cartel of all firms manages to maintain the 
monopoly price and share out production among all firms.
If all firms could perfectly coordinate their sales, they would charge the monopoly price and divide 
up the market. This type of behaviour is illustrated in the BE-COMP diagram with the ‘perfect 
collusion’ line shown in Figure 8. This line extends horizontally since it assumes that the market 
always equals µmono regardless of the number of firms. Note that the monopoly mark-up is given by 
the point on the COMP curve where n=1. The equilibrium number of firms under perfect collusion 
– i.e., the maximum number of firms that could break even under perfect collusion – is given by 
point A. The level of industrial production under perfect collusion is shown by point CA.
Figure 8. Industrial restructuring induced by competition policy
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Starting from this situation, consider the impact of an EU-wide competition policy that breaks 
up the cartel. If the competition policy were completely effective, the situation would move to E. 
The result would be a severe drop in the number of firms, but since the mark-up and price fall, 
the sector’s total output rises to C. Firms are able to break even in this more competitive, lower 
price environment since the industrial restructuring has resulted in fewer, bigger firms with lower 
average costs. 
If competition policy is imperfect and some collusion prevails, we would get an intermediate 
outcome: industrial output would be larger (smaller) and the number of break-even firms smaller 
(larger) than in a situation of perfect collusion (competition policy). In Figure 8, this outcome is 
labelled as ‘partial collusion’ and the associated equilibrium is denoted with B.
 
Where does policy coordination come into the picture? Consider the implementation of a perfect 
competition policy starting from point A in Figure 8. We know that the number of firms will fall 
from nA to n, but which nation’s firms will survive?
To be concrete, suppose the EU consists of only two nations, each with an equal number of firms to 
start with. If there are some natural trade barriers between the two markets (this means stepping 
slightly out of the assumption behind the diagram), and one nation pursues a less aggressive, 
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or delayed competition policy than the other nation, there will be a tendency for fewer firms to 
exit in the nation that pursues a laxer policy. In the end, the overall number of firms will fall to 
something like n, but the share of industrial production in the nation with the lax policy will be 
greater, potentially much greater. It is possible that something like this is going on in the electricity 
and water markets in Europe.
The problem with this uncoordinated response is that fear of such an outcome might make both 
nations hesitate to committing to a competition policy that would be in both their interests. 
In this sense, EU-wide competition policy is important in so far as it lets members believe that 
market forces rather than devious national policies will lead industrial restructuring. Without such 
assurances, it is unlikely that EU members would allow deeper market integration to go ahead. 
Or, to put it differently, EU-wide competition rules are not so important in what they can achieve 
compared to what national competition policies could, they are important in what they prevent 
– beggar-thy-neighbour competition policy.
It is worthwhile to finish with a brief analysis of the welfare implications of an EU-wide policy 
that succeeds in fostering competition. To this end, we look at the welfare changes resulting 
from industrial restructuring that proceeds from perfect collusion via partial collusion to Cournot 
competition. In Figure 8, this is the move along the BE curve from A to B and finally E. Note first that 
in our simplified model firms’ profits do not change: while the number of firms falls as the industry 
approaches E, those firms operating in the market just break even – there are no excess profits. In 
a sense, firms share the fate of the hero in the movie ‘Life of Brian’ – they start with nothing and 
they end up with nothing. This implies that it is the change in consumer surplus that determines 
the impact on society’s welfare. In this respect, the message transpiring from the middle panel of 
Figure 8 is clearly positive: with a decline in prices and an increase in consumption, the consumer 
surplus – measured by the usual area under the demand curve – continuously increases. While 
measured in the middle panel of Figure 8, the source of this welfare gain is shown in the left-hand 
panel, namely the realisation of scale economies and the associated decline in average production 
costs. To conclude, while our simple framework inevitably abstracts from real-life complications 
– for instance that industrial restructuring is not without frictions but comes with adjustment cost 
– it seems fair to conclude that, ultimately, competition policy as an industrial policy has lot to 
offer to EU nations. 
3.  Delegation vs. coordination
So far, we have viewed coordination in an institutional vacuum – the issue was whether EU nations 
should coordinate their policies or whether each nation should set its own policy. One of the key 
insights emerging from this discussion is that coordination makes sense in some cases but not 
in others. What is more, the merits of coordination might vary over time for a particular issue. In 
practice, most coordination – notably of industrial policies – is done by getting nations to agree 
on policies. There are cases, however, where the cost of policy coordination is so high that nations 
delegate the policy to a supranational body.
To set the scene, let us look at a clear-cut case for delegation of a non-industrial policy, that is, 
monetary policy in the eurozone. Before the euro was introduced, national central banks in Europe 
coordinated their policies. They did so since coordination was viewed as providing economic 
benefits that outweighed the costs of adopting a one-size-fits-all monetary policy. However, as 
the exchange rate crises of the 1990s showed, the cost of coordination without delegation can 
sometimes be quite high. The ultimate response was to delegate monetary policy to the EU level. 
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This, in essence, was more a change in the decision-making procedure than a change in the policies 
adopted. In the run up to adopting the euro, EU central banks were following almost identical 
monetary policies (as gauged by interest rates). When the euro was introduced, the main change 
was in how the common policy was decided. Before EMU, each central bank governor decided on 
the nation’s monetary policy in coordination with other central bank governors. In EMU, governors 
are deciding – together with the executive board of the European Central Bank – while sitting in 
the same room.
Another example for delegation rather than coordination is EU trade policy, with the Common 
External Tariff not set at the national but the EU level. Here again, one could in theory at least 
think of coordination of different national trade policies. However, coordination in this case would 
be rather difficult and cumbersome, especially if it allowed for differences in external trade policies 
to exist among EU members. A common trade policy with, in particular, a single external tariff, is 
also a way to help trade integration among EU countries (by avoiding the problems of the rules 
of origins for example). Hence, delegation makes sense as it has been decided ex ante that trade 
policies of member countries should be identical.
And then there are EU policies where there is delegation alongside coordination. For example, EU 
members have decided to coordinate some aspects of their regional policies in the form of the 
‘structural funds’. The level of spending for the EU and its allocation among members is decided 
at the EU level. But the choice of individual projects is decided in national capitals, although these 
choices are guided by general guidelines and objectives set at the EU level. This example also 
nicely illustrates the key difference between coordination and delegation. When the EU decides 
in the context of its Financial Perspective (the EU’s seven-year budget) on the size and allocation 
of structural funds, the decision-making rule is unanimity and agreement is difficult. But since 
it is absolutely essential that all members agree on the amount of funds and its allocation, the 
decision must be delegated to the EU level. The choice of individual projects in each nation could 
also benefit from coordination at the EU level, but getting unanimous decision on these projects 
would be so difficult and time consuming that the cost of deeper coordination would outweigh 
its gains.
When it comes to industrial policy, the relevant example is surely that of structural funds. There are 
merits from coordinating industrial policy at the EU in a general manner, for instance with a view 
to avoiding beggar-thy-neighbour industrial policies. But the choice of individual projects involves 
local knowledge and local spillovers, so fusing the national decision-making into a single EU body 
is likely to yield greater decision-making costs without substantially improving policy choices.
4.  Coordination and the localness of industrial policy spillovers
4.1 Defining localness
The main conclusion emerging from of the previous sections is that coordination should be the 
exception rather than the rule. Given the endemic problem of information asymmetries and the 
disciplining effect of jurisdictional competition on special interest groups, it is probably a good idea 
to presume that policies should not be coordinated unless a strong case can be made in favour of 
coordination. If nothing else, the time and energy needed to coordinate detailed industrial policies 
among nations as diverse as the 5 EU members should be enough to suggest that decentralised 
policies should be the general presumption.
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Having said this, it is important to analyse in greater detail the scope of spillovers associated with 
national industrial policies. This will provide a better understanding of when coordination does 
not make sense and when it does. What is more, it will provide a framework for thinking about 
which types of policies would be good candidates for coordination.
A key principle guiding this analysis is that spillovers and industrial policies can be local in two 
senses of the word. For one thing, they can be local in the standard spatial sense, i.e., they only 
affect firms in a well-confined geographical area, a city, a region, or a nation – for instance. For 
another, they can be local in the sense of only affecting narrow sectors. Using this distinction, we 
examine, first, spillovers and industrial policies that affect output markets and, second, those that 
are relevant for factor inputs.
4.2 Industrial policy spillovers and the localness of outputs
Because most manufactured goods are easily traded, few pro-manufacturing policies have purely 
local effects. There is, nonetheless, a range of localness. When it comes to negative spillovers – the 
most common one being ‘unfair competition’ effects propagating through goods markets – there is 
a close link between the cost of trading the good and the extent of spatial localness of the policy’s 
effect. But quite independent from the spatial reach of spillovers and industrial policies, spillovers 
and policies might affect only a narrow range of firms, or a narrow sector. Combining spatial and 
sectoral dimension, we can think of five distinct cases, as illustrated in Figure 9.
Case A: no spatial and sectoral spillovers. Consider a policy that has only very local effects in 
both the spatial and the sectoral dimension. A direct subsidy to a gravel quarry in France’s Haute 
Savoie, for example, would promote industrial output. The spillovers of this policy, however, would 
be limited. Gravel is relatively expensive to transport over long distances, so the subsidy is unlikely 
to have negative effects on other regions and nations. As to the sectoral impact of such a subsidy, 
gravel is highly local since it is not used as an input in many other sectors. Moreover, gravel tends 
to be an input only in non-traded goods, such as roads.
Under WTO rules, a subsidy to a particular gravel pit is actionable, and under EU rules it is 
probably prohibited. But since no one is likely to complain about it, it is not a good candidate for 
coordination. Indeed, given the general lack of positive or negative spillovers it is probably best 
to leave such policies to the discretion of EU member states.
Case B: positive spatial spillovers but no sectoral spillovers. One example is a subsidy to foster 
drug-development technologies in the pharmaceutical sector. The effect is local in the sectoral 
sense since it only helps pharmaceutical firms develop drugs, but it helps such firms in all nations 
(even if it is under patent). This is a classic example of the sort of vertical industrial policy that 
would benefit from coordination to mitigate free-rider behaviour. Moreover, even if this policy 
would be actionable since it is specific, it is unlikely to be challenged since it benefits firms around 
the world.
Case C: negative spatial and narrow sectoral spillovers. In this category, we find most of the 
commonly prohibited industrial polices. A classic example is a nation-specific production subsidy or 
tax-break in a traded goods sector. For example, if one EU nation were to subsidise the production 
of cars, carmakers in the rest of the EU – and indeed in the world – would be harmed as they would 
sell fewer cars at a lower price than they would without the subsidy. EU and WTO rules forbid such 
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subsidies, and the injured firms are sure to complain. In this case, industrial policy is coordinated 
but in the sense of a coordinated prohibition of the industrial policy.
Case D: positive spatial and sectoral spillovers. An example of a policy with positive effects 
across spatial locations and sectors is an educational system that produces a few world-class 
scientists and engineers, France’s École Polytechnique for instance. The graduates of such schools 
tend to work in industry and laboratories producing new knowledge that is useful in a variety of 
industrial activities. However, not all of them work in France and even those who do often produce 
knowledge that promotes industry worldwide. Again, the free-rider problem suggests that too little 
of such training is done, so coordination could well be welfare enhancing.
Case E: negative spatial and sectoral spillovers. This is the mirror image of the previous case. 
In the enlarged EU, it is often asserted that low social charges and corporate taxes in new EU 
members harm the industrial competitiveness of ‘old’ members. As the analysis in Figure  showed, 
there is some truth to this, in which case this sort of ‘system competition’ might well constitute an 
industrial-policy example in region E of Figure 9. For such policies, coordination has, in principle, 
the potential to make all nations better off. In practice, however, there is a genuine risk that 
political expediency leads governments to coordinate on too high a level of social charges and 
taxes, thereby equalising industrial competitiveness across EU nations at the price of undermining 
Europe’s competitiveness as a whole. 
Figure 9. Two dimensions of localness of industrial policy spillovers
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To conclude the discussion of the localness of industrial policy spillovers on output markets, we 
have seen that specific industrial policies often create negative pecuniary externalities that lead 
nations to coordinate on their prohibition. This has shifted the focus to general, i.e., horizontal 
policies. Some of these policies affect output directly. For example most nations provide some sort 
of tax credit or accelerated depreciation allowance for capital investments. Much of industrial policy, 
however, concerns inputs, so it is worth thinking through the basic logic of how the promotion 
of certain types of inputs can affect a nation’s industrial base. This takes us to industrial policy 
spillovers and the localness of inputs.
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4.3 Industrial policy spillovers and the localness of inputs
Two questions will be of concern here: first, what are the chances of an input-oriented industrial 
policy to succeed in promoting industrial production and employment in the jurisdiction of the 
government implementing it and, second, to what extent should such policies be coordinated 
among nations? In answering these questions, an important consideration concerns the mobility 
of the inputs promoted by the policy and policy spillovers. We thus consider factors of production 
in two dimensions – their mobility and their spill-over potential. 
Figure 10 presents a schematic depiction of the features of seven productive factors: three types 
of labour, two types of knowledge, and three types of capital. The main purpose of this diagram 
is to help organise thinking about the effects of various input-promoting industrial policies.
Figure 10. Mobility and spill-over potential of inputs
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The idea of this diagram is to suggest that one way to think about desirable types of industrial 
policy and the need to coordinate them is to consider their combination of mobility and spillovers. 
At one extreme, an industrial policy that promoted a nation’s financial capital would have little 
local effect on industrial production. The point is that the newly created capital would flow to the 
nation where its reward would be highest. As a result, much – maybe even most – of the effect of 
this industrial policy would be to boost industrial production in other nations. Since the promoting 
nation has to pay for the policy but gets little of the benefit, this sort of scheme will be unpopular 
with individual nations. But of course this is also a reason to coordinate if it turns out that financial 
capital is crucial to industrial output, a proposition that we doubt.
Contrast this with the impact of promoting basic scientific and technological knowledge. Such 
knowledge is easily transported around the world and so it is highly mobile. However, the benefits 
of employing it are not localised; this sort of knowledge often creates important positive spillovers 
for industry in other nations. We could think, for instance, of new intermediate products that 
facilitate the introduction of new products and, more generally, new products and processes across 
the world. Advances in material sciences are an example of this. Hence, public spending on R&D 
is a natural candidate for coordination as illustrated by Figure 5. The possible mutual gain from 
coordination, measured by the distance between the two indifference curves, would be large. 
In analysing input- 
oriented industrial 
policies, it is useful to 
consider input factors 
along two dimensions: 
their mobility and their 
spill-over potential.
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Moving down the mobility scale, physical capital is internationally less mobile than both financial 
capital and basic scientific knowledge, especially after it is sunk, and it has intermediate spillovers. 
High-skilled labour is next, but it combines comparatively low international mobility with 
a reasonably high degree of spillovers. This combination is one of the reasons why almost all 
governments believe that subsidising technical and business education is one of the best ways 
to promote their nation’s industrial competitiveness. Although highly educated workers do switch 
nations, they are far more attached to the nation who paid for their education than, for instance, 
financial capital. Hence, in terms of gains from coordination (in terms of Figure 5, the distance 
between the two indifference curves), education for high-skilled labour would certainly range 
between basic science and promotion of financial or physical capital.
Tacit knowledge is the next in the schematic diagram. Tacit knowledge is a slippery concept, 
but this is on purpose. It is meant to represent the knowledge that seems to encourage spatial 
clustering of production – in Silicon Valley and Northern Italy, for instance. This knowledge is 
difficult to promote directly, but it has the great advantage of being unlikely to leave the nation 
once it has been created. This unique combination explains why so many nations are trying to 
create industrial clusters, or hubs. The gains from coordination are therefore certainly quite low 
except for possible transnational clusters. 
The position of medium-skilled and low-skilled labour requires little comment. Low-skilled workers 
are relatively mobile in today’s Europe, at least relative to medium-skilled workers (craftsmen, 
mechanics, and so on). Neither medium-skilled nor low-skilled labour generates much spillovers 
in the sense of there being large differences between the social and private returns to these types 
of labour.
Finally, each nation, and indeed each location in each nation, has ‘social capital’ and this affects 
the appeal of the location for workers and firms alike. What is social capital? A great deal of human 
interaction, not only in the sphere of economics, depends upon factors like trust and reliability. 
Clearly, the extent to which societies are marked by these intangible factors varies enormously. If 
a citizen forgets his wallet at a bar in a small village in the north of Sweden, she is almost certain 
to get it back within hours. If the same happened in the centre of Rome, the outcome could be, 
but need not be, as happy. Since economic interactions require trust, too, a sense of social justice 
and trust can be an important magnet for economic activity. In essence, good social capital lowers 
transaction costs and thus fosters economic activity. On the spillovers scale, social capital is very 
localised, but it provides benefits across most sectors. The gains from coordination would certainly 
be very low. 
All told, high international factor mobility makes it difficult for individual nations to fully appropriate 
the positive effects of policies that promote mobile inputs. This undermines nations’ efforts to raise 
the quantity and quality of such inputs. What makes the situation worse is that each nation thinks 
it could free ride on the efforts of other nations. It follows that coordinating policies in support of 
factor inputs is most important when international factor mobility and spillovers are large, such 
as in the case of basic science, high-skilled labour, and physical capital.
5.  Conclusions and policy implications
Industrial policy is something all nations do. Since the effects of one nation’s industrial policies 
are not entirely limited by its borders, the effects of industrial policies overlap. In principle, this 
Coordinating policies in 
support of factor inputs 
is most important when 
international factor 
mobility and spillovers 
are large.
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suggests that coordinating industrial policies at the EU level might be a good idea. But would it 
be a good idea in practice?
The spillovers from national industrial policies can cause helpful or harmful competition among 
policy makers and helpful or harmful interactions among the targeted industries. It is not in general 
possible to say whether industrial policy coordination is good or bad. Note that this ambiguity is 
not a universal feature of all policy. For example, the case for coordinating external trade policy 
in a customs union like the EU is ironclad. Nothing but harm could come from allowing each EU 
nation to decide its own external trade policy.
While the benefits of industrial policy coordination are not easy to pin down in general (although 
they can be quite obvious for certain cases such as Galileo), we can be quite sure that reaching 
agreement at the EU level on any type of policy – trade policy, monetary policy, or industrial policy 
– would be a very costly exercise in terms of time and political goodwill.
The contrast between the vagueness of the benefits of coordination and the surety of the decision-
making costs leads to some clear policy conclusions. First, there will be instances of industrial 
policy in which European-wide coordination will yield large benefits. In these cases, the benefits of 
teaming up will outweigh the costs of agreeing to and adopting a unified policy. Second, in most 
cases of industrial policy, the cost of coordination – both economic and political – will outweigh 
the benefits. Third, the combination of the first two points suggests that the EU has no need to 
set up a new structure for coordinating industrial policy. In the few cases where the merits of 
coordination are obvious, they will be obvious to all and ad hoc cooperation will work.
While it is in general 
not possible to say 
whether industrial policy 
coordination is good or 
bad, the EU has no need 
to set up a new structure 
for coordinating 
industrial policy.
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